Should Governments Guarantee Universal Access to Higher Education? 

Higher education completion rates in advanced countries are only 25.6% in 2010(Barro and Lee 32). Comparing that to the 11.9% of people who attend college globally, we can see that there is a gap that does not represent a difference in ambition but a difference in resources. For millions of students, whether they can continue learning beyond high school depends on access instead of capability. Should governments guarantee universal access to higher education? Examining this question through the economic, political, and ethical lenses will reveal that while there are reasons why higher education shouldn’t be guaranteed by the government, there are more, stronger reasons saying the opposite. 

When looking at the economics of universal access, what first comes to mind is free higher education. While the case for making higher education free appears compelling on the surface, there are nuances that make it not so clear. The OECD’s Education at a Glance states that “"Adults with a tertiary qualification earn, on average, 54% more than those with only upper secondary education,” and that, “the average lifetime financial benefit of obtaining a tertiary qualification exceeds USD 300,000 across the OECD." Multiplied across a population, the returns are argued to repay the public cost of education. David J. Deming supports this view in The Economics of Free College, arguing that “the short-run cost of expanding access to higher education is potentially large” but that “the long-run cost is much smaller.” Combining these two pieces of evidence together paints a picture that while it may cost much for students to go to college for free, they will make up for it in the future. 

However, it might not be that straightforward. The Peter G. Peterson Foundation estimates that “in the year the program is implemented, a last-dollar program would cost the government $28 billion” and that over an 11 year period this rises to $415 billion. Furthermore, this is the cheapest model they have. 

However, Deming’s claim that long-run costs are smaller assumes that everyone enrolled will graduate. Ferreyra et al. in The Limited Impact of Free College Policies found that "universal free college expands enrollment the most but has virtually no effect on graduation rates." This is a peer-reviewed working paper using cross-country data, which helps its credibility. However, it’s important to note that as a working paper it has not yet undergone full journal review. When a student enrols but does not graduate, they receive none of the extra earnings the OECD describes while public money is still spent. With Deming’s own acknowledgement of the precision needed for a working free college plan, “a poorly designed free college plan could make the problem worse,” it’s easy to see the many ways that a free college plan can go wrong. 

Another issue is whether or not this actually helps the people who need it. Mathew M. Chingos found that “under the Sanders free college proposal, families from the top half of the income distribution would receive 24 percent more in dollar value from eliminating tuition than students from the lower half of the income distribution.” This is because, "students from families in the top income quartile attend colleges that charge about $1,200, or 20 percent, more than the colleges attended by the typical student from the bottom income quartile." 

The political case for governments guaranteeing universal access to higher education already exists in international law. Gilchrist points out that "Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes the right to education, stating 'everyone has the right to education' and 'higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.'" Furthermore the UN international Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights claims that "higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education." Essentially what this is trying to say is that there already exists an obligation to guarantee access to higher education. 

Furthermore, we can actually see this fully implemented in some countries. Sharapov shows that "Germany represents one of the most comprehensive models for implementing this right through free public higher education" and that "the Constitution of the Russian Federation, adopted in 1993, guarantees free higher education in state institutions on a competitive basis." It is here too that we see Indonesia’s choice to "allocate at least 20 percent of the national budget to education." These are real commitments that have moved frameworks from aspirational to real. 

However, it can also be argued that legal texts do not support access to higher education as much as advocates suggest. McCowan says that while Article 26 of the UDHR guarantees that higher education "shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit," it has "no mention of the level of overall access for the population," and concludes that "the right guarantees that higher education be accessible, but not generally available." McCowan publishes in the British Journal of Educational Studies. His analysis is grounded directly in treaty text rather than advocacy framing, which makes the limitation he identifies harder to dismiss. Essentially, what he is trying to say is that while the law says they have to remove the barriers to higher education, it doesn’t guarantee that everyone will be able to make use of these removed restrictions. 

This counterargument, while correct, understates the political movement behind the right. Gilchrist observes that "in the United States, we have become complacent, accepting that university costs are so high that they are out of reach for many" and that "this needs to change" The Scholars at Risk Free to Think 2025 report further demonstrates that the political stakes of higher education extend beyond tuition: "insulating the higher education sector from attacks requires securing formal legal protections for academic freedom and university autonomy, and the implementation of those protections." There does clearly exist an extremely strong political obligation to care toward the higher education system. This reinforces the point that universal access to higher education is something governments are obligated to protect. 

Past just legal obligations, governments also have a deeper responsibility to ensure their people are educated, because uneducated populations are historically more susceptible to authoritarian rules. Sanborn and Thyne, analyzing eighty-five authoritarian regimes from 1970 to 2008 in the British Journal of Political Science, found that “higher levels of mass, primary, and tertiary education are robustly associated with democratization.” The peer-reviewed cross-country design and explicit inclusion of tertiary or higher education makes this source directly relevant to the topic of higher education. Carnevale reinforces the point further, finding that “authoritarian preferences and attitudes are weaker among people with higher levels of educational attainment — particularly those with a bachelor's degree or higher.” 

The best reason ethically for governments to guarantee universal access to higher education is dignity. The Democracy & Education, citing Article 13 of the ICESCR, says "education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." They display higher education as a mechanism through which humans can develop their full capacity as a human. Furthermore, this means restricting it is akin to denying humans a chance to be who they are. The International Journal of Secondary Education agrees, saying that "the first and last purpose of education is to guarantee that dignity is preserved and promoted in every human being.”If all humans have an inherent value or potential, barring them from drawing it out can, and is seen by these sources as an ethical issue. 

Public school systems are a key concept in this discussion because they are magnitudes more accessible than higher education systems. As Senator Elizabeth Warren argues, "our public schools for K-12 students are free for everyone. That's because we understand that a high school-level education is a basic need for our society and our economy — and it should be available to all." Then why should a younger student be more entitled to new knowledge than an older student. 

However, ethicists are not all this aligned. Marginson raises a good question about the positional nature of degrees, noting that "there are doubts about the extent to which those individual pecuniary outcomes can be attributed to higher education itself, as distinct from the social backgrounds and networks of students and graduates." Marginson is a leading higher-education researcher at UCL, but his working paper set-up means that the argument is more speculative rather than being settled or finalized. This is an issue because if universal access to education lessens the value of a degree without addressing the things that shape who benefits from education, then the dignity we are looking for will likely not be granted even if access is increased. 

However, this concern isn’t enough to justify saying that there shouldn’t be more access. If the ethical goal of making college more accessible is the development of human dignity, then the answer to the question of access not being enough is not to ignore it, but to demand access and demand more of the institutions providing it. Complacency in the face of an ethical violation is itself an ethical failure. Which is why, from an ethical lens, there is a strong reason to guarantee universal access to higher education. 

The clearest gap in my research is on policy design. My research shows that free college increases enrollment without increasing graduation rates. However, they do not specify which design features actually change the outcomes for students from the bottom income quartile. Further research comparing graduation rates across the German and Indonesia programs could help answer whether the “poorly designed” failures Deming discussed could be avoided. This question matters because if there is an obligation to guarantee access to higher education, then there is no question about the implementation's necessity. It becomes more of a question on how the government can meet this obligation. 

Working through these three lenses changed how I viewed this question. I originally thought the economic argument could be strong as I had heard before that free college would pay for itself just based on the ROI of an overall smarter populace. However, Ferreyra forced me to consider completion rates into the equation. Furthermore, Chingos made me consider the possibility that free college may not even help the one it needs to help the most. This made me realize that the economic lens was the weakest leg of the pro-access argument. The dignity argument and authoritarianism evidence reframed the question from one of “does this pay off” to “what do governments owe their citizens.” This perspective change helped me gain a lot of understanding about the issue and make my final judgement. 

Weighing the three lenses against each other reveals which ones are the most impactful. The economic case is contested. The OECD’s lifetime returns are substantial, but Ferreyra’s observation that free colleges do not lift graduation rates and Brookings’ regressive distribution data show that the pro-access economic argument depends heavily on policy design that doesn’t exist. This makes the economic case favor that higher education shouldn’t be a guarantee. The political case is stronger, with legal obligations existing in UDHR and ICESCR and governments like Germany, Russia, and Indonesia acting on it. Furthermore, Sanborn and Thyne’s cross-country evidence link authoritarianism to the restriction of education. However, McCowan’s distinction between accessibility and general availability pose a fair limit. The ethical case is the strongest with the dignity argument grounded in ICESCR not being contingent on whether a particular policy works in any particular country. Marginson’s concern is real but is more about implementation rather than principle. The economic objections are focused on design more than the underlying obligation. Governments should guarantee universal access to higher education. The work they need to do so however is building political will and policy infrastructure to ensure that the impact is meaningful for students regardless of the life they were born into.